The Prison Service has never really seen itself as a law enforcement agency.
Its traditional role has been custody and, latterly, rehabilitation. Yet parts of the prison system have become arguably lawless. Criminal markets flourish, intimidation goes unchecked and organised criminals run businesses from their cells. The state has effectively surrendered control to those it is supposed to contain.
Charlie Taylor, the outgoing Chief Inspector of Prisons, put this problem firmly on the agenda in his 2026 Longford Lecture. His account of the prison drug economy and the influence of serious organised criminals was stark. He was right to challenge the assumption that imprisonment necessarily prevents people from continuing to organise crime. His proposal for specialist separation units deserves serious consideration.
But if we are serious about tackling organised crime in prisons, we need to think beyond simply creating another type of prison unit.
The organised crime problem
In my previous contribution for the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies, From snout to spice: how British prisons lost control, I estimated the value of the illicit prison drug economy at around £1 billion a year. Nobody has yet challenged that estimate with a credible alternative.
This is not simply a problem of drugs getting through the gate. It is about the organised criminal networks controlling supply, enforcing payment and exploiting prisoners and their families. Prisoners who arrive drug-free can acquire addictions inside; those unable to pay may face violence and intimidation, while their families are drawn into the business.
The individuals exercising this influence are often known to prison intelligence. Yet searches, adjudications, transfers and temporary restrictions rarely disrupt the networks themselves. Move a prisoner and, unless the underlying influence is addressed, the business can simply move with him.
As Charlie Taylor has recognised, some individuals are so powerful and well connected that conventional prison regimes are inadequate to manage them. We would not tolerate a terrorist continuing to direct an organisation from a prison cell. Why should organised crime bosses be treated differently?
A different kind of separation centre
The objective should be to disrupt the ability of these individuals to direct criminal enterprises, intimidate others and maintain their networks. This requires intelligence-led allocation, controlled communications and carefully managed associations, supported by effective financial investigation and close collaboration with the police and the National Crime Agency.
But there is an important qualification. These separation centres must not simply become another in-house Prison Service initiative, staffed and managed by the same organisation, using the same assumptions and institutional culture that have allowed the problem to develop. There is little point creating a specialist unit if it is run by people whose experience is confined to conventional prison management and who lack the knowledge, skills and experience to understand and disrupt organised crime.
They should instead be genuinely joint operations, bringing together the Prison Service, the police, the National Crime Agency and, where appropriate, intelligence and financial investigation specialists. Their leadership should come from outside the conventional Prison Service management structure, with someone appointed for their proven experience of serious organised crime and law enforcement. Prison expertise remains essential, but it must be combined with external capability, not treated as a substitute for it.
There must be clear lines of responsibility, independent oversight and meaningful accountability. Placement decisions should be evidence-based, proportionate and regularly reviewed, with proper legal safeguards and opportunities for challenge. Separation must not mean simply warehousing people indefinitely. Regimes should remain lawful and humane, with access to healthcare, purposeful activity and opportunities to address offending.
Success should be measured by whether criminal networks are disrupted, drug markets weakened, violence reduced and prisoners and their families protected.
We have done this before
There was a time when the Prison Service worked closely with the police and other law enforcement agencies. As a governor, and later as head of the Prison Service’s Corruption Prevention Unit, I experienced the value of that collaboration in tackling criminal networks operating from within prisons. That relationship seems to have largely disappeared as the service has become increasingly isolationist, seeing itself as separate from, rather than part of, the country’s law enforcement machinery. We need to rediscover that partnership.
The Amber Rudd review
Charlie Taylor’s argument deserves more than another expression of concern followed by business as usual.
The Amber Rudd review offers the chance to turn that argument into something practical. It should consider not simply whether separation centres are needed, but how they should be established, who should lead them and how they should be held accountable.
The answer cannot be another internal Prison Service structure, designed and managed by the organisation whose shortcomings it is intended to address. We need external expertise, joint operational ownership and leadership with the authority to challenge established practice.
We incarcerate people in the name of public protection. If those with the greatest capacity to organise crime can continue to operate from prison, custody is doing the opposite of what it is meant to do.
Charlie Taylor has identified the problem and pointed towards a practical response. The Amber Rudd review should take that opportunity seriously.
We need to stop treating prisons as places where the normal rules of law enforcement somehow cease to apply.